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CURRENT DECISIONS
is the benefit the bankrupt's estate and its creditors have derived from
the services rendered.
The court concluded its opinion with a financial summary which
showed a balance of $4,200 out of gross assets of $19,000; against this
balance were claims of allowances for $5,500, and priority claims of
over $50,000. Nothing was available for general creditors. On the basis
of these figures, the court thought it was reasonable to reduce the ap-
pellants' fees from $2,500 to $750.
Bankruptcy courts under section 60(d) now have more latitude than
ever before in assessing fair and reasonable attorneys' fees. Levin and
Weintraub v. Rosenberg" involved a substantial reduction in fees, and
it is immediately evident that courts handling bankruptcy matters have
already strongly considered Congressional intent and the spirit of the
Bankruptcy Act-to assess fees so as to give the greatest benefit to the
creditors, and at the same time, to protect the bankrupt from further
depletion of his estate.
David Beach
Constitutional Law-FREEDOM OF RELIGIoN-HALLUCINOGENS: THE
RIGHT TO SIMULATED SPIRITUALIs M. The Native American Church
of California has no membership requirements, no church records, no
recorded theology, but has an estimated membership of 30,000-250,000
Indians. The religion of the Church embraces the consumption of
an hallucinogen, lophophora, better known as peyote. Lophophora
embodies the Holy Spirit and the partaker enters into contact with
the Deity. The clinical effects of the consumption of lophophora are
manifold. Varying with the individual, it ordinarily produces two
stages: in the first, it acts as a stimulant causing wakefulness with
physical and mental exhilaration, and, in the second, as a depressant
causing an intoxication with accompanying visions and hallucinations.
During a service, defendants in People v. Woody,' were apprehended
and charged with the unlawful possession of lophophora in violation of
Section 11500 of the Health and Safety Code.2 They pleaded not guilty,
11. Supra note 3.
1. People v. Woody, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 (1964), reversing 35 Cal. Rptr. 708.
2. CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE, § 11500; § 11540 specifically prohibits the possession
of lophophora.
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contending principally that their possession occured in the exercise of
their religion, and, as such, the statute making such possession unlawful
abridged their constitutionally guaranteed right to the free exercise of
religion as declared in the First Amendment.3 The trial court rejected
the contention, upheld the statute prohibiting possession of this toxic
substance, and supported their conclusions by their judicial cognizance
of the reasonable relation to the promotion of public health, safety, and
general welfare. The Appellate Court affirmed the decision, but the
Supreme Court of California reversed the judgment by their balancing
of competing values on the symbolic scale of constitutionality. The
court felt that the unprescribed use of lophophora was but a slight
danger to the state, and to the enforcement of its laws, while the use of
lophophora incorporated the essence of defendants' religious expression.
Anticipating reactions, the court in summary said:
We know that some will urge that it is more important to subserve
the rigorous enforcement of the narcotics law than to carve out of
them an exception for a few believers in a strange faith.4
A state has the inherent power within Constitutional limits to pro-
mote health, safety, and general welfare of the society,' and whenever
conditions appear in the state which present a substantial threat, the
duty arises on the part of the state to enact such provisions.6 California
has previously sustained public health, safety and welfare statutes al-
though rights of citizens may be affected,7 if by any fair construction it
has a tendency to effect its object." Furthermore, if the meaning of
the provision is plain, then there is no opportunity nor justification for
judicial construction.9
The decision in People v. Woody10 allows a carving and an exception
from the health and safety laws of California based upon the First
Amendment, operative upon the states by means of the Fourteenth
3. U.S. CoNsT., Amend. I.
4. Supra note 1 at 821.
5. Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505 (1903); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887);
State v. Big Sheep, 75 Mont. 219, 243 Pac. 1067 (1926), discussing the laws punishing
unlawful possession of lophophora in Montana. See generally, 31 U. CiNc. L. REv. 335
(1962).
6. People v. Kervick, 42 N.J. 191, 199 A.2d 834 (1964).
7. Rosenblatt v. Cal. State Board of Pharmacy, 69 Cal. App.2d 69, 158 P.2d 199 (1945).
8. In re Gray, 206 Cal. 497, 274 Pac. 974 (1929).
9. Sandelin v. Collins, I Cal.2d 147, 33 P.2d 1009 (1934).
10. Supra note 1.
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Amendment." When this type of assertion is made, the State must
convincingly show an overriding and compelling state interest 2 to
justify the possible infringement of personal rights.' 3
The First Amendment inhibiting legislation in regard to religion has
a double aspect. It prevents compulsion by law of the acceptance of
any creed or the practice of any religion. It permits freedom of con-
science and freedom to adhere to any religious organization or form of
worship. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen
form of religion.' 4 A dual concept emerges: the freedom to believe and
the freedom to act.' 5 The first is absolute, but the latter cannot be.
One's conduct must remain subject to regulation for the protection of
society.' 6 If it were otherwise, one could excuse any behavior by be-
coming a law unto himself through the expression of his professed
religious belief.17
The Supreme Court in the well known Reynolds v. U.S.' case held
Congress could constitutionally apply to Mormons a prohibition against
polygamy, and, in doing so, promulgated a basic test for the constitu-
tionality of state legislation. The degree of abridgement of religious
freedom must be ascertained, and the degree of danger to the state must
be determined.' 9 However, an inadequate showing of state interest will
invalidate state legislation regardless of the degree of the infringement
of an individual's religious belief.20
The use of lophophora by the defendants in their religious belief can
be examined, not by intruding into the religious issue, but by question-
11. Cantwell v. Conn., 310 US. 296 (1940); Schnuder v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
12. Gibson v. Fla. Leg. Investigation Comm., 372 US. 538 (1962).
13. Murphy v. Cal, 225 US. 623 (1911).
14. Cantwell v. State of Conn, supra note 11.
15. In re Currence, 248 N.Y.N.2d 251 (1963).
16. Shelden v. Fanin, 221 F. Supp. 766 (D. Ariz. 1963); U.S. v. Wilhiard, 211 F. Supp.
643 (N.D. Ohio 1962); Holdridge v. US, 282 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1960); Cude v. State
of Ark., 377 S.W.2d 816 (Ark. 1964); State v. Congdon, 76 N.J. Super, 493, 185 A.2d
21 (1962); Craig v. Md., 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959).
17. Davis v.Beason, 133 U.S. 33 (1890).
18. Reynolds v. US., 98 US. 145 (1878).
19. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 509 (1960); Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158 (1943);
Bridges v. State of Cal, 314 US. 252 (1941); Whitney v. People of State of Cal., 274 US.
357 (1926); Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47 (1918); Levitsky v. Levitsky, 231 Md. 338, 190
A.2d 621 (1963).
20. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 Us.
516 (1959); Niemotko v. Md., 340 US. 268 (1950); W. Va. State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); In re Jenison, 125 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. 1963); Brown v.
McGinnis, 10 N.Y.2d 531, 180 N.E.2d 791 (1962).
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ing whether or not the claimant holds his belief honestly and in good
faith.21 Assuming the use of lophophora to go to the essence of their
religion, the indiscriminate use of it as a "health restorer" as found in
the trial court, should have been given more attention by the Supreme
Court of California.22 Instead, they briefly stated that they did not, in
fact, use it in place of medical care. This is not necessarily a contra-
diction, as they may well have sought medical aid, reserving lophophora
for minor ailments. Surely the court was cognizant of the effect of
indiscriminate and unprescribed use of an hallucinogen. The danger to
private citizens operating motor vehicles would alone be sufficient to
show a compelling state interest. By ignoring the specific health and
safety laws of the state, the court has legally sanctioned unprescribed
use of lophophora, endangering the paramount interests of the individual,
and depriving society of protection which it needs and should have.
The public interest is clearly established, the action of the legislature
is embodied in a properly drawn law satisfying the requirements of
definiteness and certainty, and it should not be prevented from giving
such protection on the basis of a doctrinaire and inflexible interpretation
of the federal bill of rights.23
If the courts did not deem this a sufficient compelling state interest to
permit legislation limiting religious freedom of action, it should have
affirmed the appellate court's holding for yet another reason. Neither
a state nor Congress can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all re-
ligions, or prefer one religion to another.2 4 If the distribution of Gideon
Bibles in public schools amounts to a preference of one religion to
another,25 how then may the Supreme Court of California accord to the
Native American Church the right to unprescribed use of a narcotic
in violation of health and safety laws without, in fact and in law, pre-
ferring their religion to another?
Balancing of values is the essence of judging. However, the Supreme
21. U.S. v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). Contra, State v. Big Sheep, 75 Mont. 219,
243 Pac. 1067 (1926), the court while examining the tenets of the Native American Church
found no basis for the use of lophophora in Romans, Isaiah or Revelations as claimed.
The court held the use or lophophora to be inconsistent with good order, peace and
safety.
22. Feiner v. N.Y., 340 U.S. 315 (1960).
23. Nutting, Is the First Amendment Obsolete? 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 167 (1947).
24. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
25. Tudor v. Board of Education, 14 N.J. 31, 100 A.2d 857 (1953); see also, Schempp
v. School District, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible reading in schools); Brown v. Orange
County Board of Public Instruction, 128 So.2d 181 (Fla. 1960) (prohibiting the distribu-
tion of King James Bibles in schools).
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Court of California has not considered the whole spectrum of values.
The compelling state interest should have sufficed to affirm the convic-
tion of the defendants, especially when the reversal does result in the
preferential treatment of the members of one religion to another.
Penelope Dalton
